Problem with Disgust Law

An issue that I'd like to raise with the theory that law should be based on disgust, a human sensation, is that it oversimplifies a very complex problem and, in doing so, often harms the overarching situation more so than it helps. By allowing a person to justify their actions by claiming that it spurred in them intrinsic emotions that promote aversion you allow that person the legal flexibility to use that position to justify most behaviors. One case where a man shot two lesbians because it disgusted him is no different than the actions that philosopher Dzung Nguyen could wrought. Nguyen believes that heterosexual families (and, in certain ways, heterosexuality) is an abomination of nature, that men and women are separate species and should not live together. Neither of these stances, in my opinion, have any legal footing, though for very different reasons. 

By making the claim that a legal decision can be based on a complex emotion shows out tender habit of searching for a simple solution for a complex problem. However, this conundrum, though tragic, is inescapable. For example, in cases of affirmative action, the justices, lawyers, or parties involved cannot abolish racism or erase it from history, but instead do what they can to analyze the present situation, consider the actions that they can enact, and work to use those actions to promote ideals that reflect some greater sensibility. However, even this statement falls prey to our desire for a transcendental answer, some end all solution that can be trusted unquestionably. 

Similar to the profundity and incredulity of religious faith, legal scholars look for the one inarguable principle that will defeat any argument, and do this to ignore the glaring issue of our own incompetency. Understandably, there is no way that we can examine all of the possible factors, elements, and outcomes of any case. But our habit of saying "disgust is an unquestionable sensation that can be used to justify irrational decision" will leave more people hurt than helped as it ignores factors that we can consider.

In summary:

1) Disgust is little more than a subjective sensation, not an intrinsic indicator of holy or transcendental law

2) To side with disgust ignores the complex mechanics and phenomenology of law, society, and life

3) While we cannot examine cases exhaustively, we can and should examine them to as extensive as can be allowed to be fair and just to all parties that are able to be considered.